Multi–Church? by Steffaniak, Jordan L
2020 TheoLogica   
An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 
Published Online First: June 24, 2020 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v4i1.23653  
1 
 
Multi–Church?  
Analytic Reflections on the Metaphysics of 
Multi–Site and Multi–Service Ecclesiology 
 
JORDAN L. STEFFANIAK 
University of Birmingham 
jlsteffaniak@gmail.com  
 
Abstract: Multi–site and multi–service ecclesiology has become common 
place in many areas over recent decades. This innovation has not been 
subjected to rigorous systematic or analytic theological thought. Therefore, 
this article subjects these ecclesiological variations to critique and finds 
them wanting. It offers four theological principles by which to analyze the 
nature of the church and determines that multi–site and multi–service 
churches fail to meet the necessary requirements for what is required of a 
numerically identical Protestant church. Therefore, it is metaphysically 
impossible for multi–site and multi–service churches to exist as the 
numerically same church. Each multi–site or multi–service entity is its own 
numerically distinct local church. 
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The current ecclesial milieu includes numerous variations of church gatherings 
such as “multi–site” and “multi–service.” While multi–sites are a far more recent 
phenomenon, multi–services have been ongoing for several decades and are nearly 
ubiquitous among growing congregations.1 Both variations are largely necessitated 
by numerical growth whereas the multi–site model is especially underwritten by 
technological advances. Before the explosion of large cities and the invention of the 
motor vehicle, most churches simply did not have the pressure of growth that 
often creates the need for these ecclesial practices. Despite the ballooning of both 
variations, little work has been done to consider the legitimacy of these methods 
beyond mere pragmatic considerations. As multi–site and multi–service defenders 
Brad House and Gregg Allison admit: 
 
1 Multi–service churches existed before the 1970’s but didn’t become commonplace until the 80’s 
and 90’s. See (Leeman 2020, 28). 
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Practically speaking, we had few options. Turning people away who wanted to 
hear the gospel was simply not an option. This move to a multisite expression was 
driven pragmatically by a need for space, and little thought was given to the 
trajectory on which this set the church. This pattern of growth is typical for most 
churches as they stumble into multisite (House and Allison 2017, 23). 
 
Given the newness of these developments, their pragmatic character, and the 
overall lack of analytic engagement on issues of ecclesiology in general, these 
ecclesial modifications have not been subjected to any sustained form of analytic 
theological research.2 Therefore, I intend to assess and critique multi–site and 
multi–service ecclesiology from an analytic perspective. I do this primarily in a 
deconstructive manner by considering if these practices can fulfill the necessary 
requirements of the church. My conclusion is not the bold assertion that they fail to 
remain a church but more modestly that they create an altogether new church. In 
other words, it is metaphysically impossible to have a multi–site or multi–service 
local church that maintains numerical identity. A new church, by necessity of 
previous metaphysical commitments, is created whenever multi–site or multi–
service is implemented, no matter the external claims.3 In a roundabout way I am 
asking about the special composition question of the church. When does a church 
begin and cease to exist? Do two people praying constitute a church? Do five 
people partaking of communion constitute a church? Are time and space necessary 
elements for the existence of a church? These are metaphysical questions regarding 
the ontological status of the church and need far more analytic engagement, which 
 
2 This is the key reason for why there are few sources to draw from regarding these ecclesial 
innovations and that most sources engaging the topic are popular level or recent PhD dissertations 
that merely summarize the current debate from popular level sources. For a popular example, see 
(Surratt, Ligon, and Bird 2006). One will nearly search in vain for a chapter—or even a section—
dedicated to rigorous theological discussion regarding the usage of multi–site. Multi–site is an 
assumed theological good, at worst a theological neutral, and only pragmatic reasons are put 
forward in its favor. For a dissertation summary example, see (Frye 2011). The tide may be turning 
as evidenced by this book length (albeit short) treatment: (Leeman 2020). However, his work is 
likely to spark more popular and pastoral level debate than it is analytic engagement. 
3 See (Leeman 2020, 17). He similarly argues, saying, “there is no such thing as a multisite or 
multiservice church based on how the Bible defines a church. They don’t exist. Adding a second site 
or service, by the standards of Scripture, gives you two churches, not one.” 
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is the chief goal of this paper, besides arguing against multi–site and multi–service 
churches for Protestant convictions.4 
 
1. Defining Multi–Site and Multi–Service 
 
Before defining multi–site and multi–service, I first need to minimally define how I 
am using “church” in what follows. By “church” I mean to denote a single visible 
local manifestation of the invisible church that preaches the Word and duly 
administers the sacraments, as Article XXIX of the Anglican Thirty–Nine articles 
would put it. The invisible church is the whole of God’s elect people irrespective of 
time or space. The visible local church is a specific congregation that is numerically 
distinct from other churches. I refrain from parsing this more deeply at this point 
since doing so may beg the question and exclude multi–site and multi–service 
from the start as true local churches in this sense. Therefore, “single visible local 
manifestation” serves to be specific enough to hold the weight of the distinctions I 
will make but hopefully agnostic on the question of multi–site and multi–service 
from the start. With this clarification in hand, unless otherwise explicitly noted, 
when I speak of “denying” multi–site or multi–service I am speaking of them 
denying the numerical identity implied by the single visible local manifestation. 
This does not mean that they can’t be a church but that they aren’t the same church. 
Now, what are multi–site churches—at least for Protestants? Multi–site churches 
come in various packages. House and Allison provide two broad categories for 
what a multi–site church is. There are traditional multi–site churches that consist 
“of one church that expresses itself in multiple campuses” (House and Allison 
2017, 50). For example, church A decides to start a new “campus” 20 miles south of 
church A’s physical location. This is dubbed as “campus 2” of church A, where the 
original location is “campus 1”. Now church A has two separate physical locations 
for its Sunday gatherings but continue under the banner of church A. It is now one 
church in multiple locations. Regardless of how they define these differences, these 
churches have one central headquarters along with several subordinate locations. 
The headquarters may be completely controlling and robust or it may be that all 
locations merely collaborate under a name and budget while lacking the oversight 
typical of a centralized episcopal government (House and Allison 2017, 48–49). 
There are also newer multi–site churches that are dubbed “multi–churches” and 
consist “of one church that expresses itself in multiple churches that form a polity 
 
4 Due to the scope of this paper and my ecclesiological expertise, I largely ignore questions 
regarding whether “multi–site” or “multi–service” might function in various non–Protestant 
understandings of the church. 
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that provides the responsibility and authority to make decisions about budget, 
contextualization of ministries, and more” (House and Allison 2017, 50). On this 
model, church A does not merely have campus 1 and campus 2 but has church 1 
and church 2 under the pseudo–denominational banner of church A. I think this 
version (“multi–church”) isn’t a multi–site model and should be understood as a 
traditional form of denominationalism, however loose or tight that denomination 
may be. Since my argument is primarily against multi–sites that do not view 
themselves as distinct local churches, I will ignore “multi–church” iterations 
defined in this way. 
But even among these two broad categories there is still a large spectrum of 
practice. The multi–sites can either be physical or non–physical. For example, some 
use internet sources as an “online campus” while others are only physical 
locations. Some are identical in all iterations and some are independent, or at least 
flexible. Therefore, the various forms of multi–site churches need to be accounted 
for if a proper diagnostic is to be attempted. What links these variations together is 
the splintered location of the various “campuses” or “sites” and the centralized 
unified name and budget (at minimum) (House and Allison 2017, 50; Surratt, 
Ligon, and Bird 2006, 18, 51). Most have a centralized leadership as well, or at least 
some form of collaborative leadership. But the bottom line of multi–site is that they 
create new geographical locations for worship. Whether that location is only 5 miles 
away or potentially 5,000 miles away varies from church to church. 
But this geographic difference is slightly vague. Suppose Church A is large 
enough to have a main sanctuary and an overflow room a mere 20 feet away. In 
both locations a service is held simultaneously that is completely distinct except 
that the overflow room receives a video feed of the service that takes place in the 
sanctuary. Is this multi–site? They occur in two separate geographic locations but 
are intuitively much “closer” than regular multi–site variations. Therefore, 
geography alone might seem insufficient to define multi–site.5 But I don’t find this 
objection especially worrisome. Any distance—no matter how small—that creates 
regular distinct worship centers is sufficient to create a multi–site on my intuition. 
As long as the focus of worship is a distinct location, it is multi–site. Therefore, I 
would claim that such a scenario is a multi–site.6 
Next, what are multi–service churches? Multi–service churches are often 
identical worship services at different times of the same physical church location. 
 
5 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this helpful call for clarification. 
6 I do make accommodation for unique and irregular situations. If the overflow room is only 
temporary, I think it would be possible to avoid the conclusion that it is a completely different 
church. 
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These are mostly used in order to accommodate larger congregations with limited 
space. For example, church A has a seating capacity of 300. They have one service 
at 11:00 AM. They grow to the point that they are at capacity. They must turn 
people away from their service since they can only seat 300. To accommodate more 
growth, they create a second service at 9:00 AM that is identical in every way (i.e. 
the same pastor preaches the same message, the same musicians sing the same 
songs, etc.) in order to effectively double their capacity. In doing this they maintain 
the same ruling leadership (whether the congregation, elders, or something else), 
the same budget, the same name, and the same facility while splitting up their 
worship gatherings into two separate temporal groups. There are also multi–
service churches that create minimally differing services to accommodate 
preferences in worship. For example, church A decides to start a second service at 
9:00 AM to accommodate the more “traditional” as opposed to “contemporary” 
preferences of their congregation. In this way they maintain the same ruling 
leadership (whether the congregation, elders, or something else), the same budget, 
the same name, and the same facility while changing the “style” of worship—
which is usually just the style of music. Regardless of the reasons for creating a 
duplicate service, rather than creating a new geographical space for worship (like 
multi–site), multi–service maintains the same geographical space and creates a 
new temporal space for worship. 
Therefore, these churches appear to demarcate between essential and non–
essential properties for a numerically identical church based on their practice and 
the few published expositions. If it is to be a multi–site or multi–service church it 
requires several elements. But it also allows for flexibility on others. To restate 
them formally, they are: 
 
Essential to Multi–Site/Multi–Service: Name, budget, and sometimes 
leadership 
 
Non–Essential to Multi–Site/Multi–Service: Time and space 
 
Someone may wonder how the church name could be conceived as essential. 
Maybe when church A starts campus 2 (as in example one), they decide to give it a 
different name, though it functions the same. What then? I think this critique is 
right. But maybe the idea is that there is something deeper that binds these two 
locations besides an outward name. Maybe the name is an outward expression of 
something they are trying to express about their ontological makeup. They are the 
same church but in multiple locations. So quantifiable aspects like name, budget, 
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and leadership can be non–essential but express something essential. A bond of 
commitment toward one another’s flourishing that isn’t extended the same way to 
other churches. But this is somewhat vague, and vagueness isn’t helpful for 
subjecting multi–site and multi–service to analytic investigation. Therefore, I 
surmise that the chief essential commitment of multi–site and multi–service 
churches is this: the belief and commitment that they are the numerically identical 
local church despite change in time and space. The name may change, the budget 
may be divided, the leadership may be decentralized, yet the various locations 
believe and are committed to the claim that they remain the same instantiation of 
the local church as they were before their innovation. But the real claim about 
multi–site and multi–service churches that is provocative in my estimation is that 
change of time and space does not create a distinct local congregation. It is this that 
I want to primarily examine. Can time and space truly be considered as non–
essential aspects of the local church? If they can be non–essential to the 
metaphysics of ecclesiology, I see no problem with these ecclesiastical practices. 
However, if they are essential, it will be metaphysically impossible for them to 
exist as numerically identical local churches. 
 
2. Assessing Multi–Site and Multi–Service 
 
Given these definitions, I need to first proffer the theological justification for multi–
site and multi–service in order to best assess whether the potential cost is worth 
the perceived benefit. This is typically agreed to be pragmatic in nature—such 
ecclesiological formulations produce evangelism and mission. But it is not just 
pragmatic missional success that is championed, House and Allison also claim 
there is further “solid theological justification” since “multisite fosters the biblical 
and theological virtues of unity, cooperation, and interdependence”(House and 
Allison 2017, 41, 43). So, there are two primary benefits according to multi–site and 
multi–service adherents: mission and virtue. But are there theological reasons to be 
skeptical of such benefits? To this I now turn. 
Given the commitments of multi–site and multi–service to relegate both time 
and space to non–essential aspects of the local church, what is necessary for 
something to constitute a true church on a Protestant understanding? If the local 
church requires spatiotemporal continuity, numerical identity cannot be 
maintained for multi–site and multi–service formulations. Therefore, in what 
follows, I provide four separate diagnostic composition principles for ecclesial 
bodies to determine if such practices are compatible with a traditional Protestant 
understanding of the church and what is necessary for its numerical identity. 
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The Marks of the Church Principle 
 
First, Article 29 of the Belgic confession gives three common marks of a true church 
endorsed by nearly all Protestant thinkers. A true church has right gospel 
preaching, a right administration of the sacraments, and rightly practices 
discipline. If a church is to be counted as true, they must practice all three. For 
example, Michael Horton explains the content of the church in a similar way, 
saying, “through preaching, baptism, and admission (or refusal of admission) to 
the Communion” the church is formally constituted (Horton 2008, 243). However, 
some Protestants have been wary of using more than one mark—the Word of God 
rightly preached. Herman Bavinck helpfully explains that the difference is “more a 
difference in name than in substance and that actually there is only one mark, the 
one and the same Word, which is variously administered and confessed in 
preaching, instruction, confession, sacrament, life, and so forth” (Bavinck 2003, 
4:312). So, while most Protestants are willing to collapse the marks into one, I think 
it is helpful for clarity’s sake to provide the fuller list of three. 
But what counts as right preaching, sacraments, and discipline? What is obvious 
is that right practice requires biblical fidelity but what is not obvious, and of 
special important for my purposes, is whether they necessitate anything regarding 
time or space for local congregations. This is the key aspect of the marks that must 
be understood if multi–sites and multi–services are to be evaluated. Therefore, I 
will not consider other various distinctives that may be essential to these marks 
that have no impact on time or space. 
Beginning with preaching, the obvious definition of right includes the 
faithfulness of the gospel message. But what about time and space? For example, 
does right preaching require the preacher and member to be physically located in 
the exact same space at the exact same time? If so, how close must the member be? 
Could the member be within earshot but outside of the building and it continue to 
constitute right preaching? Can the member listen to the podcast later that week? If 
the content and reception of the message match up with what is traditionally 
understood to be “right”, what does time and space have to do with it? 
1 Corinthians 14 continually comments about “when you come together” and 
“the whole church comes together” being linked to edification, which commonly is 
subsumed under preaching. If this is true, it would be natural to infer that the 
same temporal space should be occupied, at minimum. For edification or preaching 
to take place rightly—at least for the premier regular worship gathering—the 
church must come together as the whole church at the same time. More than the 
same time, the same geographical space is naturally inferred as well. For example, 
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Colossians 4:16 says “and when this letter has been read among you, have it also 
read in the church of the Laodiceans; and see that you also read the letter from 
Laodicea.” The fact that Paul expects his letter to be read “in the church” suggests 
a gathered singular community in one place at one time. His command would 
have little sense if taken to be understood as “have it also read in the campuses of 
the church of the Laodiceans” or “have it read in the church of the Laodiceans, 
alongside their online webcast with the members present there,” or “have it read in 
the multiple house churches of the Laodiceans.” But why could we not make such 
an assumption? Paul was ignorant of such technological advances. And isn’t the 
whole point of the New Testament to no longer be tethered to a spatial worship 
location but be freed to worship in “spirit and in truth”? Many are likely to think 
that freedom from spatiotemporal requirements for worship is part of the New 
Covenant ethos. Therefore, even if this assumption that the freedom of worship in 
spirit and truth entails freedom to gather how we please is faulty, requiring 
sameness of spatiotemporal location based on the mark of right preaching likely 
lacks the intuitive punch required to militate against multi–site or multi–service 
without further theological justification. Even if right preaching has implications 
for time and space, it seems too hasty to deduce such robust conclusions as 
spatiotemporal simultaneity. Therefore, the mark of right preaching appears to 
have space for the possibility of multi–site or multi–church variations and is 
insufficient to deny either format. 
Next, can the sacraments be “rightly” administered or can discipline be 
“rightly” practiced without the same temporal and spatial location? For example, 
can either be administered to an online audience? Maybe there is a way to 
accommodate for the difficulties of this, but it seems unlikely or extremely 
difficult. Moreover, at least for most traditional understandings of the Eucharist, 
physical coextensive geographical and temporal location is required since the core 
meaning of it is about unity and unity cannot be displayed in the way expected if 
people are unable to physically witness one another.7 Therefore, it cannot be 
practiced in separation or isolation (Erickson 1992, 1112). How else could the 
church share in one cup and one bread? As Tom Gregg muses, Holy Communion 
is fundamentally about “the effects of salvation in the horizontal dimension of 
space–time”(Greggs 2019, 225). It is not about some ethereal non–physical non–
located individualistic meal. It is a corporate act necessarily located in space–time. 
Yes, this certainly grates against the cultural current of independence, but the 
Eucharist is not about individualism but communal life under the Cross. 
 
7 See (Gardner 2018, 518). 
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However, an anonymous reviewer mused here about the practice of the 
Reserved Sacrament in the Scottish Episcopal Church where the consecration of the 
elements must occur in one joint service but some of the very same bread and wine 
can be set aside and taken to the home–bound later in the week to extend 
communion. Therefore, despite being separated geographically and temporally, 
they are sharing in the very same cup and bread. Why would this violate the 
principle of unity? I tread softly here, as this is a delicate subject area for those in 
need, but I maintain that this does violate the unity required by the Eucharist. The 
Eucharist is a unified meal and intuitively, while leftovers from a meal can be 
delivered to others, they are no longer sharing in the same unified meal as those 
who ate it together at the appropriate time. For example, if my family shared in a 
meal but saved some of the leftovers and delivered it to a friend later on that week. 
Even though they would be eating from the very same elements that we did, they 
wouldn’t be sharing in the same unified meal experience. While it would overlap 
with the physical elements, it would utterly lack the communal experience that is 
central to the unity portrayed in the Eucharist. Therefore, I maintain the necessity 
of coextensive spatiotemporal presence for the sacrament. 
But what if a church instructed everyone to use technology to video chat one 
another, where they can physically see one another and communicate? I think this 
too fails because the Eucharist also requires whatever constitutes the “fullness of 
the local church” to partake together to display this unity. For example, in 1 
Corinthians 11, Paul admonishes the Corinthians for partaking at distinct times and 
in distinct locations. They must do so together. Therefore, they cannot take it at 
different times or different locations lest the content of the sacrament be emptied of 
its meaning. That is the point of the command in 1 Corinthians 11:33—to wait for 
one another. If spatial and temporal factors were irrelevant, this command would 
have little sense.8 Paul doesn’t offer an alternative for the Corinthians that could 
satisfy them as individuals. He doesn’t suggest partaking of the Table in separation 
on each person’s own terms. Paul commands a spatiotemporal coextensive (i.e. 
simultaneous) communal meal (Greggs 2019, 229). Therefore, if a multi–site church 
administers the sacraments, but at different times or locations, that “campus” is 
not a “campus” but a numerically distinct local church. If it fails to administer the 
Eucharist to all its campuses simultaneously—both geographically and 
temporally—it cannot metaphysically be numerically identical. And if it fails to 
 
8 See (Fee 2014, 628; Thiselton 2000, 899). Fee argues the verb “may have to do with time” but 
“Paul’s greater concern” is parity at the Table. This would mean translating the verb as “receive” 
rather than “wait.” Although Thiselton argues that “wait for” is the “entirely correct” translation. 
But even if it means “receive with one another,” the spatiotemporal element is still assumed. 
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administer them at all (e.g. to an online campus or otherwise), the more scandalous 
conclusion is necessitated—it isn’t a church at all but a faux one, being at best a 
religiously inclined society of sorts. 
But true simultaneity is nearly impossible to achieve in the administration of the 
Eucharist. Suppose a large congregation takes a full 20 minutes to serve 
communion to the entire assembled community as each member individually 
receives the bread and wine from the Pastor/Elder? The first person receiving it is 
hardly simultaneous with the last person who receives it. And where is the line of 
demarcation? 5 seconds? 5 minutes? 5 hours? Besides, even in contexts where 
communion is taken “together”, some will eat the bread and drink the wine 
milliseconds before and after others. This isn’t really “simultaneous.” And what 
about the sameness of space? Is the building sufficient to carry this weight? What if 
the church gathers in a field? How far away would be too far? Must he/she remain 
in eyesight or ear shot?9 Vagueness about this concept abounds. But vagueness 
isn’t a metaphysical problem. It is an epistemological problem. Just because we 
aren’t sure which lost hair finally classifies someone as bald doesn’t mean there 
isn’t a difference between a full head of hair and a bald one. In the same way, 
while there may be vagueness about simultaneity in the Eucharist, I think it is fair 
to assume its spatiotemporally continuous if it’s in the same gathering with 
everyone present. This is heavily context dependent. Some gatherings may last far 
longer than others. But as long as the gathering does it together without excluding 
others, I see no reason to worry about the vagueness of true simultaneity here. It 
doesn’t have to be scientifically specific. It is an inherently vague, yet intuitive 
notion. Therefore, 5 seconds is no problem. 5 minutes is probably no problem 
depending on the context. 5 hours is likely a problem. However, more theological 
justification is needed to clarify the metaphysical commitments of the Eucharist. 
A final worry arises for the Eucharist, however. If spatiotemporal simultaneity is 
required for the Eucharist does this mean that the sacraments must be practiced at 
every gathering to be a church in any sense? No. It only means that any church 
that fails to practice them in this way is inadvertently creating a new church 
entity.10 Now, if the church never administers the Eucharist to its parishioners (i.e. 
an online multi–site), this would entail that it is not a church. 
Next, regarding the mark of right discipline, it would be straightforward to 
administer discipline to a multi–service church. If the leaders are present for both 
services and keep track of all their members, discipline can be maintained. Of 
 
9 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this clarifying scenario. 
10 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this question. 
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course, the mutual encouragement and watchful eye of fellow members might be 
lacking if they only attend one service. What about a multi–site church? Even here, 
most churches have designated leaders to keep watch, minus the “online” site 
variety where this would be a logistical nightmare, if possible. Discipline becomes 
obviously more difficult the more physical locations are created, but not 
impossible per se. Therefore, it appears that discipline only requires some level of 
geographical and temporal continuity—but it need not overlap. Now that these 
three marks have been briefly extrapolated, it is helpful to denote the “marks 
principle” below: 
 
The Marks Principle: X is a numerically identical local church if and only if 
X rightly practices preaching, the sacraments, and discipline. 
 
All Protestant congregations are required to satisfy this if they are to be considered 
a numerically singular local church. In the spirit of generosity, I think two of the 
marks can be satisfied by multi–site and multi–service—right preaching and right 
discipline. But the sacraments, notably the Eucharist, likely entails a denial of 
multi–site and multi–service as they are typically practiced and understood. 
 
The Gathering Group Principle 
 
The second principle that might have implications for multi–site and multi–service 
is derived from the Apostles Creed confession of the “communion of saints.” There 
are two separate arguments that can be made from this confession. The first is the 
“definitional” argument. The claim is minimally that the definition of the church 
necessitates that spatiotemporal coextensive gathering is required: 
 
1. The church is defined as an assembly 
2. Assembly means spatiotemporal coextensive gathering 
3. ∴ Spatiotemporal coextensive gathering is necessary for church identity 
 
So, by definition this communion of saints, or “church”/ekklesia is an assembly—a 
gathered community (Turretin 1994, 3:6–8). For example, Herman Bavinck says the 
church is a gathering of believers most essentially (Bavinck 2003, 4:307). Deitrich 
Bonhoeffer muses similarly, saying, “the Body of Christ takes up physical space 
here on earth” (Bonhoeffer 2015, 225). According to Mark Dever the lexical search 
for defining the church is sufficient—spatiotemporal coextensive gathering is 
essential to church identity (Dever 2012, 133). Jonathan Leeman follows suite, 
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claiming that the definition of church is necessarily tied to the idea of place because 
classical Greek had another word for people apart from a spatiotemporal 
gathering. The ekklesia was only possible when people physically gathered 
(Leeman 2020, 49, 80). Further, the Old Testament background of assembly means 
a gathering of coextensive time and space according to J. Y. Campbell who 
comments that “there is no good evidence that in the Old Testament qahal ever 
means anything but an actual assembly or meeting of some kind” (Campbell 1948, 
133). D. Grant Gaines agrees: 
 
The Old Testament theme of the people of God in assembly and as assembly is 
rooted in the paradigmatic assembly at Sinai, is permanently instituted in the 
prescribed assemblies of the Mosaic Law, is further developed at the Deuteronomic 
assembly, is central to the poetry and hymnody of Israel, and becomes an 
important part of the eschatological hope of the prophets. Throughout the Old 
Testament, Israel is considered a single assembly because the people as a whole are 
characterized by all gathering together in the same place in corporate worship 
(Gaines 2012, 48). 
 
Similarly the New Testament commands: “And let us consider how to stir up one 
another to love and good works, not neglecting to meet together, as is the habit of 
some, but encouraging one another, and all the more as you see the Day drawing 
near” (Hebrews 10:24–25). 
But what does assembly or gathering really entail? Definitions alone do not give 
complete clarity. Indeed, even how BDAG defines church appears to leave room 
for multi–site permutations, saying ekklesia means “congregation or church as the 
totality of Christians living and meeting in a particular locality or larger 
geographical area, but not necessarily limited to one meeting place” (Danker et al. 
2000, 3b.beta). Nothing necessarily prohibits multi–site or multi–service from 
claiming gathering can be sufficiently met through other means or other 
frequencies. But Mark Dever argues that while a church is more than a gathering it 
is never less—to remove this part is to destroy the whole (Dever 2012, 135). The 
church must regularly gather together (Dever 2012, 132). Robert Banks agrees, 
claiming that church “cannot refer to a group of people unless they all do in fact 
actually gather together” (Banks 2012, 40). For example, Dever asks, “in what sense 
can it be a “church” if it never gathers together?” (Dever 2012, 133). On his 
argumentation, if the church never coextensively gathers, it cannot be called a 
church. And if a church regularly gathers in separate locations, it is not one church 
but multiple. Moreover, according to most Protestant confessional dogma the 
church must weekly gather on a particular day for public worship—the Lord’s 
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Day.11 So, why should regularly gathering in a coextensive space and time be 
considered a necessary condition for the church to remain numerically the same? 
Can definitions alone hold the weight? 
House and Allison argue that the definitional argument is insufficient. They 
think spatiotemporal coextensive gathering cannot be baked into the definition. 
They argue: 
 
Assembly and gathering are not the only translations of this word. It can refer to 
meetings of Christians in particular houses (Acts 12:12), the church in a city (1 Cor. 
1:1–2; 1 Thess. 1:1), all the churches in a region (Acts 9:31), the universal church 
(Matt. 16:18; Eph 1:21–23), the Christian people (1 Cor. 10:32), and even the saints 
already in heaven (Heb. 12:23) (House and Allison 2017, 39). 
 
They wonder why the Apostle Paul would add the modifier “whole” to church in 
Romans 16:23 and 1 Corinthians 14:23 if a physical coextensive gathered location 
were assumed in the definition of assembly (House and Allison 2017, 40). Doing so 
is begging the question. Given this critique, I think it’s better to provide a more 
robust second argument.12 
According to John Webster the church is a “social space” (Webster 2004, 10). 
John Hammett fills out the idea of social space, claiming that the local church is 
defined as “very much a matter of the quality of relationships members have with 
each other, and little to do with organizational matters” (Hammett 2017, 8). 
Indeed, the idea that the church indicates the activity of gathering as a social 
community most fundamentally is generally agreed upon (Abraham 2010, 171). So, 
a thicker argument than the definition is what I call the “gathered group” 
argument: 
 
1. The church is a social group 
2. The activities of the church required for it to exist as social group 
necessitate spatiotemporal coextensive gathering 
3. ∴ The church must gather coextensively 
 
 
11 See for example The Westminster Confession of Faith Chapter 21, The Baptist Faith and 
Message 2000 Section 8, The Savoy Declaration Chapter 22, and the Confession of Faith of the 
Evangelical United Brethren Church Article 14. 
12 See (Leeman 2020, 67–97). He notably spends a full chapter defending the definitional 
argument and responding to many of these critiques. I think he does an admirable job but lacks 
much of the needed theological “punch” to convince those who are not already convinced of his 
position against multi–site and multi–service. 
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But both premise 1 and premise 2 need explanation and defense. I will prove both 
in what follows. 
Premise 1 requires a brief foray into the nature of group theory and its 
implications for the church since the church is a group—even if supernatural.13 
Broadly construed, there are two understandings of groups, realist and non–realist. 
Realist understandings of groups take groups to be more than just the individuals 
that compose the group. They are “structured social groups with emergent causal 
powers” (Elder–Vass 2011, 144). Therefore, groups exist as wholes over and above 
the individuals and can hold beliefs, perform actions, pursue goals, and be held 
responsible. In some respect these abilities for the group are non–existent for the 
individuals but emerge as either epistemologically useful terminological concepts 
or metaphysically real group cognitive capacities.14 These metaphysically real 
capacities create some level of downward causation where groups exert influence 
on the individuals, rather than only individuals performing causative acts. It is 
only by virtue of the group that these novel properties or actions are possible.15 
Conversely, non–realist understandings of groups take groups to be nothing more 
than the individuals themselves—in short, groups don’t exist. In other words, this 
is a form of group eliminativism. Now, there is a real worry that group realism 
would overly “bloat” our ontology of the world because it would commit us to an 
infinite number of new ontological entities besides what already exists (Effingham 
2010, 252). From a purely metaphysical standpoint, this is a stringent critique. 
Though it is possible to affirm group realism and not identify groups with sui 
generis entities.16 And group realism, as I understand it, can avoid overly bloated 
ontological commitments by requiring novel causal powers for group existence.17 
This would mean that no two objects can automatically be considered a group. 
 
13 For a thorough treatment of group theory as it relates to the ontology of the church see 
(Cockayne 2019). 
14 See (O’Connor and Theiner 2010, 80). Theiner and O’Connor go on to provide a non–trivial 
and non–mysterious model of emergent group cognition that is worth consulting due to the limited 
space and focus of this paper. 
15 See (Elder–Vass 2011, 13–39); For examples of emergence besides groups, see (Inman 2018, 
143–47). 
16 See (Effingham 2010, 255–57). Effingham identifies groups with sets. Whatever ontological 
entity groups are to be identified with is largely irrelevant for my purposes. If group realism is 
metaphysically possible, my argument is safe. 
17 See (Effingham 2007). While Effingham’s primary goal is to defend restricted composition for 
material objects I think his answer that composition occurs if and only if the object that two objects 
compose is causally efficacious is what should be used for the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for group theory as well. 
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They must jointly produce emergent properties that previously did not exist. The 
tree and clock tower on the University lawn do not form a group because they do 
not have any novel causal powers together that they lacked as individual entities. 
More importantly from a theological perspective, non–realism about groups 
does not make sense of the biblical literature or philosophical coherence when it 
comes to the church. As John Webster notes, the church is “not a purely 
eschatological polity or culture. It is what men and women do because of the 
gospel. The church is a human gathering; it engages in human activities; it has 
customs, texts, orders, procedures, possessions, like any other visible social entity” 
(Webster 2004, 25). Indeed, Scripture ascribes numerous examples of group beliefs, 
group actions, and group responsibility to the church. These are novel and 
emergent causal powers and properties that do not exist apart from the group. 
They depend on the individuals being organized in a particular way—in this 
scenario, “churchwise.” Without the existence of the group, the powers and 
properties we see evidenced cannot exist (Elder–Vass 2011, 66–67). So, a non–
realist group theory would require any talk of the “church” to be merely a 
metaphor for the individuals (Cockayne 2019, 108). And Scripture demands the 
existence of the group—“I will build my church…” says Jesus (Matthew 16:18). If 
this is true, non–realism about groups is prima facie faced with significant 
challenges. 
For example, Galatians 1:6 says “I am astonished that you are so quickly 
deserting him who called you in the grace of Christ and turning to a different 
gospel.” The “you” in this verse is plural, indicting the entire Galatian church of 
wrongdoing. If non–realism about groups is true, how would the Apostle be able 
to universalize the moral responsibility to the entire group? Elsewhere Philippians 
2:2 says, “Complete my joy by being of the same mind, having the same love, being 
in full accord and of one mind.” While this is an exhortation to a state not yet 
achieved, it is important to note that it is considered possible for the Philippian 
church to attain a unified mind and belief. While it is possible to take the Apostle to 
mean that each individual has the same beliefs, it seems more natural to 
understand it as a group belief. Finally, 2 Corinthians 9:5 says, “So I thought it 
necessary to urge the brothers to go on ahead to you and arrange in advance for 
the gift you have promised, so that it may be ready as a willing gift, not an 
exaction.” Here the Apostle assumes both the will and ability to perform a group 
action. Even beyond Scripture, there are basic philosophical challenges for non–
realism. As Joshua Cockayne explains, “If group eliminativism is true, then we 
cannot hold corporations responsible for their actions, or place ethical demands on 
political parties, but we can only dictate what individual members of these groups 
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can or should do” (Cockayne 2019, 108). More so, to deny the reality of groups 
would require an individual level explanation for everything typically attributed to 
groups, which has yet to be done (Tollefsen 2015, 138). Based on this very brief 
foray, the group (i.e. the church)—at minimum—is more than just the individual 
disciples, which I think justifies Premise 1 sufficiently. 
Now, why should multi–site or multi–serve proponents accept Premise 2? Can 
multi–site and multi–service churches affirm group realism without gathering 
spatiotemporally? After all, they claim to hold beliefs, perform actions, pursue 
goals, and be held responsible just like normal churches. And the very core of their 
existence is a belief and commitment as noted previously. If the necessity of a 
coextensive gathering for the church is to be viewed as essential to group realism, 
this must be proved. 
The necessity of coextensive gathering largely depends on what form of group 
realism is taken to be accurate. Broadly speaking, there are two versions of 
realism—redundant and non–redundant realism (List and Pettit 2011, 7). 
Redundant group realism, most labeled as “Authorization” theories, claims that all 
group agency talk is fundamentally redundant. Whatever is said of the group 
reduces to the individual level. Non–redundant theories, typically “Animation” or 
“Functional” theories, claim that group talk is non–redundant, i.e. some things said 
of the group are not reducible to the individuals. The differentiating factor is that 
animation theories assume the group is non–individualistic, so that nothing said of 
the group can reduce to the individual while functional accounts maintain the 
individual. Prima facie, animation theories struggle to affirm basic Scriptural ideas 
such as the reality of individual disciples (not to mention their overtly 
metaphysical problems), therefore it is unlikely that this is consistent with 
Christian thought (Cockayne 2019, 115). Authorization theories also faulter due to 
their denial of a serious commitment to the reality of group talk, as shown above. 
Given this, the remaining alternative for identifying the group theory of the church 
is a functionalist account, which at minimum argues that group states depend on 
the way they function in the system it belongs to rather than the intrinsic material 
constitution (Tollefsen 2015, 48, 69). The truthmaker for groups in this case is not 
the individuals alone but the individuals functioning as certain sorts of agents—i.e. 
acting. 
Given that group realism and functionalism are the only ways to make sense of 
Scripture and philosophical coherence, what is necessary for a group like the 
church to exert group like actions such as having beliefs, performing actions, 
pursuing goals, and being held morally responsible? And what actions might be 
unique to the church that are not present for other groups? Might spatiotemporal 
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coextensive gathering make the cut? Consider this example: it is common practice 
for members of two distinct churches to gather for various reasons. Maybe 
Brandon is a member of First Baptist and Conner is a member of First Presbyterian. 
Yet Brandon and Conner regularly gather for theological discussion. Maybe their 
discussion rises to the level of worship one evening and they sing hymns together. 
Does this mean they are no longer members of differing churches but their own 
new church? Most would intuitively say no, but on group theory they are 
functioning in such a way. They are acting together. So why would they not be 
considered a church? Why would a group need more than singing hymns together 
to be a true church? While such an aspect may be necessary, it is not sufficient for 
the existence of a true church. Regular coextensive physical presence for weekly 
public worship is also necessary for a true church because the “group” that fails to 
gather regularly for formal public worship (e.g. Heb. 10:24–25) fails to form the 
proper intentional states required for group existence as far as the Scriptures define 
the church. Without regular coextensive spatiotemporal gathering the group 
cannot act in ways that are necessary for “churchwise” group existence. Nor can 
the church be held accountable as the Scriptures assume about the nature of the 
group that is the church. And the church is clearly a group with ethical demands 
placed upon it on Scriptural grounds. 
Given these characterizations, what is minimally true for the spatiotemporal 
presence required of a local ecclesial body to form beliefs, perform actions, pursue 
goals, and be held morally responsible? Douglas Estes has argued that online 
presence can fulfill this more than physical (Estes 2009, 27). So maybe a conference 
call or an online group chat can satisfy what we typically think of as coextensive 
physical presence. In both contexts people can interact through speech and 
listening, and some church services only require these things. Therefore, if Estes is 
right, we should modify Premise 2 because spatiotemporal gathering isn’t what the 
church is after. It is actually after coextensive presence. As long as the group is 
“together” in some sense where they can interact, this satisfies the necessary 
conditions from Scripture and continues to maintain group status. 
But the presence required for group realism and the structure of the church 
group in Scripture is minimally the causal nexus of action and knowledge.18 People 
 
18 See (Inman 2017, 169–70). There are other conceptions of presence that are metaphysically 
“thicker” than the “causal nexus of action and knowledge” but I utilize the minimal definition for 
maximum argumentative power. If the minimal definition of presence cannot be satisfied by multi–
site or multi–service, the maximal definition surely cannot be satisfied either. Inman defines these 
two views as “fundamental location” and “derivative location.” Here I take derivative location to 
be the minimal definition only requiring an object to stand in some relation to a distinct entity (in 
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must be able to know what is going on in the gathered group and must be able to 
act in real ways to influence the gathering. They must have the ability to have 
“direct knowledge” and exert “direct action” on the group. They must be able to 
hold beliefs, perform actions, and be held responsible as a group. For example, no 
online service or temporally or geographically extended site or service will allow 
each member to practice “teaching and admonishing one another in all wisdom” 
(Colossians 3:16), or to greet one another with a “holy kiss” (2 Corinthians 13:12; 1 
Thessalonians 5:26) (Herrington 2017, 31). Such an approach would handicap basic 
obedience to biblical texts. While a holy kiss may be culturally conditioned, surely 
the relevant cultural transfer would still require a physical handshake or hug. 
Without a physical means of appropriation, this is either severely limited or 
removed altogether. As another example, would a “member” of an online site be 
held responsible for the actions of the church? On most normal intuitions, the 
answer is obviously no. More is required from someone than mere online 
“attendance.” 
While “presence” might be a vague notion, most have strong intuitions about 
when it is fulfilled. For example, when someone harbors bitterness because a dear 
friend wasn’t present at their wedding, this naturally means they weren’t 
physically there. Or suppose a more pragmatic example. Imagine a missionary 
couple in an unreached location, though they have internet access. They watch 
every church service live on the internet. They text, call, and video call members of 
the church weekly. They even pray together with the church each day. I would 
imagine the missionary couple would still feel disconnected as if something 
additional was missing. This may be a vague example, but I think it minimally 
shows the point. There is something more to the necessary presence for groups 
than knowledge or action available via an extended spatial location. Distance—
temporally and geographically—mitigates what group presence requires. These 
individuals are unable to exert “direct action” on the group or have “direct 
knowledge.” Both acts are mediated. Consider a more common scenario. In 
contemporary culture grandparents often live great distances from their 
grandchildren. Yet they want to maintain a relationship. Since the advent of video 
chatting software, they have often utilized this to create a greater mode of 
presence. And yet no grandparent or grandchild would say that this version of 
presence is sufficient for what they think of as normal full presence. Talking 
 
this case a relation of action and knowledge) rather than being located in its own right as 
fundamental location requires. 
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through a video screen is insufficient for practicing normal embodied presence. 
But counterexamples abound of other multi–site “congregations.” 
However, nearly every major business has several locations and yet is one and 
the same company. Why can this not be true for the church? These are clearly 
groups that exist and perform the basic acts of groups and yet do not find the same 
level of presence as a basic requirement for numerical identity. But even in 
technologically savvy companies that have moved to remote employee models, a 
certain degree of presence is missing. All aspects of group theory lag for groups 
that do not gather in spatiotemporal coextensive ways. For example, if members of 
a group meet separately from the main group and the main group commits a 
crime, it would be difficult to hold the group as morally responsible. Further, the 
church is not an organization of individual producers but of communal family life. 
The actions required for group status for the church are different than 
corporations. Further, even multi–site and multi–service defenders like House and 
Allison admit that “presence requires embodiment and relationship” (House and 
Allison 2017, 105). And since humans are embodied, they are essentially located in 
time and space. Therefore, no online video can satisfy the criterion of 
spatiotemporal coextensive gathering (House and Allison 2017, 106). And the 
Scriptures repeatedly express the superiority of face–to–face meetings (2 John 12; 3 
John 13–14; Rom. 1:10–15; 1 Cor. 16:7; 2 Cor. 1:16). But what about the invisible 
church? This doesn’t require spatial presence as suggested above and maintains 
“group” status. But if we remove spatiotemporal presence from the local church, 
the local church ceases to exist since it cannot function as a group based on the 
demands of group theory leaving only the universal church. 
Given the necessity of spatiotemporal coextensive gathering for group status 
below is a distillation of what is minimally required for ecclesial group presence: 
 
The Gathering Group Principle: X is a numerically identical local church if 
and only if X can experience the requisite direct action and knowledge of 
presence required for group realism. 
 
Can multi–site or multi–service satisfy the gathering group principle? Neither are 
in the same geographical location at the same time. Neither typically visually see 
the other members of the congregation. Neither can greet or embrace one another 
in typical ways. Neither perform the same actions nor form the same beliefs in 
typical scenarios. Neither can be held responsible in the ways required of group 
realism. Therefore, multi–site and multi–service churches fail the gathering group 
principle, which requires more than what both can offer. Technological advances 
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in the future may significantly mitigate the challenges of the gathering group 
principle but nothing can replace the embodied presence of someone in one place, 
at one time, with another. Therefore, embodiment provides a deeply 
anthropological requirement for the nature of the church. If humans are necessarily 
embodied and necessarily social creatures, this would most naturally entail 
physical gathering for embodiment and social conditions to most robustly be 
satisfied. Social interaction at its greatest levels require coextensive physical 
presence. For example, what married couple would find being in different places 
sufficient for their intimate relational bond? But most fundamentally the gathering 
group principle requires sufficient direct action and knowledge for responsibility 
in the group which is significantly more than any non–physical variation can offer. 
No one physically absent can exert direct knowledge and control. Multi–site and 
multi–service may hold beliefs, but they cannot perform actions or be held 
responsible in the ways typically ascribed to groups on group realism nor can they 
perform multiple basic biblical commands. 
But what if I am spatiotemporally present in the gathering but not mentally 
present?19 And if I’m not mentally present, I won’t form beliefs, perform actions, or 
be held responsible in the typical robust way needed for church identity. While 
true, unless I am unconscious, I am present nonetheless. Even if I am daydreaming, 
there are parts of the gathering I continue to engage in. I continue to possess the 
ability for direct knowledge and direct control immediately. And there is virtually 
no scenario where I avoid any and all group actions if I am physically present. Lest 
I slide in the back doors after the service starts, avoid all eye contact, stare at my 
phone for the duration, play music through my headphones so I hear nothing, and 
leave before the service ends, I see no reason to think all group actions are absent. 
The more pressing issue is likely to be this—what member of a local church would 
act in such a way in every worship gathering? I see no real scenario where this 
would obtain. 
So, let me spell out the final argument here since it has been extensive. The goal 
has been to substantiate the thesis that spatiotemporal coextensive gathering is 
essential to church numerical identity: 
 
1. The church is a social group 
2. Group realism is required for the existence of the church group 
 
19 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for posing this penetrating question. 
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3. The church is required to perform actions such as hold beliefs, interact as 
a social space (e.g. greet one another, admonish one another, sing to one 
another) and be held responsible to be maintain this group status 
4. The actions the church is required to perform as a group require 
spatiotemporal coextensive gathering 
5. ∴ Spatiotemporal coextensive gathering is required for the church 
 
The argument itself is valid. And based on my summary of group theory and basic 
biblical descriptions of the church as a group, I think it is sound as well. 
Therefore, based upon these two principles, do multi–site or multi–service 
groups count as numerically identical churches? I argue that they do not. I argue 
that these two conditions are necessary and have implications for where and how 
churches meet. Multi–site and multi–church can meet the requisite conditions for 
preaching and discipline but fail the sacraments and gathering. If one is willing to 
give up the Eucharist and group realism, then a case for multi–site or multi–service 
might be more realistic. But if the Eucharist and group realism remain, multi–site 
and multi–service cannot. Legion of new churches are created at the behest of 
multi–site and multi–service creators because each forms a metaphysically distinct 
entity by their group actions. 
But are these the only diagnostic composition principles that are necessary 
conditions for church identity that are relevant to multi–site and multi–service 
variations? It depends. If one is Reformed in polity there is also the regulative 
principle that must be encountered. Also, the various ecclesial polities in general 
should be considered. Therefore, I will very briefly provide two further principles 
since many Protestant multi–sites and multi–services fall under their umbrellas. 
 
The Regulative Principle 
 
First, the regulative principle is defined succinctly by the Second London 
Confession in section 22 as: 
 
The acceptable way of worshipping the true God, is instituted by himself, and so 
limited by his own revealed will, that he may not be worshipped according to the 
imagination and devices of men, nor the suggestions of Satan, under any visible 
representations, or any other way not prescribed in the Holy Scriptures. 
 
They affix Deuteronomy 12:32 as a proof text. This means that only things such as 
reading, preaching the scriptures, hearing the scriptures, teaching/admonishing 
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one another through psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs, and the administration of 
the sacraments are counted as legitimate means of worship. Therefore, since there 
are no explicit multi–site or multi–service examples in Scripture, they would 
violate the regulative principle. But many argue that there are examples in 
Scripture (House and Allison 2017, 38–39). For example, according to House and 
Allison “the very first Christian church was a multisite church” (House and 
Allison 2017, 31). They say, “where and when did all this activity take place? In 
two locations: in the temple and from house to house” (House and Allison 2017, 
32). The Roman church (Rom 16:5, 14–15) and the Laodicean church (Col 4:15) met 
in multiple locations (House and Allison 2017, 33). Even the Second London says 
in section 22: 
 
Neither prayer nor any other part of religious worship, is now under the gospel, 
tied unto, or made more acceptable by any place in which it is performed, or 
towards which it is directed; but God is to be worshipped everywhere in spirit and 
in truth; as in private families daily, and in secret each one by himself; so more 
solemnly in the public assemblies, which are not carelessly nor wilfully to be 
neglected or forsaken, when God by his word or providence calls thereunto. 
 
However, it later says: 
 
As it is the law of nature, that in general a proportion of time, by God's 
appointment, be set apart for the worship of God, so by his Word, in a positive 
moral, and perpetual commandment, binding all men, in all ages, he has 
particularly appointed one day in seven for a sabbath to be kept holy unto 
him, which from the beginning of the world to the resurrection of Christ was the 
last day of the week, and from the resurrection of Christ was changed into the first 
day of the week, which is called the Lord's Day: and is to be continued to the end 
of the world as the Christian Sabbath, the observation of the last day of the week 
being abolished. 
 
Thus, the question to be determined is not whether the church can gather 
separately and remain the numerically same church throughout the week but 
whether they can gather separately continually on the Lord's Day and continue as 
the same local church. Therefore, examples of the church meeting separately do 
not necessarily entail that they practiced a multi–site or multi–service polity. It just 
means they met together more regularly than the Lord’s Day alone. So, the 
regulative principle can offer a further principle for ecclesiology if one is apt to 
accept it: 
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The Regulative Principle: X is a numerically identical local church if and 
only if X gathers regularly and simultaneously on the Lords Day for 
worship. 
 
The regulative principle doesn’t necessarily deny that something is a numerically 
identical local church if they practice more meetings than the Lord’s day since they 
are doing more than what a local church must do rather than less. There are no 
examples in Scripture of a church gathering at different times or different locations 
for public worship on a regular basis and being considered the same local church. 
Therefore, it should not be a practice. The only way a multi–site or multi–service 
church could avoid this conclusion is to prove from silence or further deductive 
argument that churches in Scripture practiced their multi–polity and provide 
sufficient explanation of group realism and the Eucharist. 
 
The Polity Principle 
 
The final principle I consider is the polity principle which discounts congregational 
or autonomous church variations. This means that no multi–site or multi–service 
has the ontological makeup to remain either congregational or autonomous. By 
ontological necessity it is an episcopal or Presbyterian denomination. By 
congregational or autonomous polity, I mean a church government structure that 
prohibits external authority from determining anything in the church. Each local 
church is completely free to make their own decisions. Since most multi–site and 
multi–service churches functionally have differing bodies submitting to a singular 
leadership, congregational polity is automatically ruled out. Even in the variations 
that give authority to the different campuses or locations, there is still a group of 
leaders that exercise oversight over all the congregations. If a church is to claim 
any autonomous polity it cannot practice multi–site or multi–service without 
violating its own principles. Therefore, the polity principle is noted below: 
 
The Polity Principle: X is a numerically identical local church if and only if 
X is completely free from external oversight. 
 
But what if these multi–sites and multi–services say, “so long as all congregants 
have voting rights for all important decisions, there is no polity problem”? If this is 
the case, the principle may be sufficiently fulfilled. But in so doing they likely deny 
the gathering group principle by removing group agency. If voting is all that the 
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individual members do to compose the church, the church becomes an extremely 
thin entity. It seems that far more should be required than voting. Most would 
want true action that takes place in deliberative endeavors which requires 
reasoning among the church members and not just voting.20 Otherwise, they could 
simply deny this principle and affirm a different polity. There is no problem with 
affirming Episcopal or Presbyterian polity, but many continue to claim 
congregational or various autonomous polities despite functioning otherwise. This 
is a serious problem for churches that continue to claim a polity that disagrees with 
their fundamental makeup. These churches must either reject their denominational 
affiliation in favor of their pragmatic ecclesiological concerns or reject their 
ecclesiological innovations. There is no third alternative that can allow for 
autonomous polity and multi–site or multi–service. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To this point I have primarily argued that multi–site and multi–service variations 
create numerically distinct local congregations. But I have also gestured toward 
theological “costs” involved. One may wonder what cost there is if these remain 
true churches. What’s really the problem then? Well, some multi–sites aren’t 
churches, which is detrimental to the spiritual health of those who are deceived. 
Online multi–site variations cannot administer the sacraments. Therefore, they are 
not local churches and any attempt to convince their “congregants” otherwise is 
spiritual malpractice. But I suggest that there are costs for multi–site churches that 
remain true churches as well. As Jonathan Leeman argues, “changing a church 
structure changes its moral shape” (Leeman 2020, 17). I think the moral costs are 
this: confusion on polity, diminution of communal brotherhood, and potential 
rejection of claimed polity. First, confusion on polity is due to the falsity of the 
claim that multi–sites and multi–services are the same church. The claim may not 
appear deadly but when there is falsity in the very definition of an entity, this is 
problematic for derivative thinking. If the foundation is broken, the structure itself 
is perilous. Moreover, as Leeman notes, “institutional structures speak and teach 
and train” (Leeman 2020, 30). A confused structure will beget confused disciples. 
Second, the demands of communal relations from the New Testament cannot be 
followed on these polities which is perilous for those committed to obedience and 
robust discipleship. Some even claim that there are other serious ethical 
implications since these ecclesial variations have a tendency to demand constant 
 
20 See (Tollefsen 2015, 64). 
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growth and efficiency, sacrificing “people on the altar of success” (White and Yeats 
2009, 82–83). This is not a necessary entailment from multi–site and multi–service 
but does appear more likely in my estimation. Third, in a similar vein as the first 
danger, churches may unknowingly deny the polity they claim allegiance to which 
can cause unnecessary friction among parishioners and leaders. 
Given the four necessary conditions for a single local church, I contend that they 
provide enough clout to outweigh the multi–site and multi–service benefits of 
virtue and mission. Minimally, if the marks principle and the gathering group 
principle are to be taken seriously, no multi–site or multi–service is metaphysically 
feasible. Besides, for those pragmatically inclined, there are likely plenty of other 
pragmatic avenues that might produce mission and virtue that fit within the 
framework of these four principles. It’s not as if single–service and single–location 
churches can’t produce virtue or mission. It is an assumption based purely on 
external numerical growth to consider otherwise. Indeed, single–site and single–
service churches require a greater catholicity since they do not have the means to 
accommodate the growth that multi–site and multi–service attempt to resolve 
(Leeman 2020, 39). 
Greater effort and consideration should be put forth in pursuing and cultivating 
methods that are consistent with this mere Protestant understanding of the local 
church. I am sure there are more arguments both in favor of multi–church 
variations and against them. My hope is that this paper spurs more research and 
argumentation on this particular ecclesiological innovation—even to the detriment 
of my own arguments in the pursuit of truth. While my conclusion may appear 
dogmatic in the negative overly stringent sense, I think such argumentation can 
muster better future argumentation. It is easier to come to a proper conclusion 
when the debate lines are clearly marked. More modestly, however, I hope to have 
shown that multi–site and multi–service shouldn’t be accepted without further 
theological vetting. In fact, I wonder if the common parishioner would even find 
single–site and single–service as more intuitive, if not minimally more desirable. 
What church member wouldn’t desire more opportunity for pastoral care, 
oversight, and community relationships that all come from single service 
churches? In the end, pragmatic considerations should not unduly influence the 
discussion. The marks principle, gathering group principle, regulative principle, 
and denominational principle should all be considered in the brewing debate and I 
hope this work contributes to further theological examination of it. 
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